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It seems like anytime one opens the business section 
of a western newspaper there will be at least one article 
that relates to Caspian energy, and whether it should 
flow east or west, through Russia or bypass it. But 
rarely do these articles explain why Caspian energy 
reserves are critical to one or another market; whether 
it is realistic to expect large volumes of Caspian gas 
in particular to reach European markets without going 
through Russia; and whether their failure to do so poses 
a security risk for Europe or an economic and security 
risk for the Caspian states.
The Caspian region has vast gas, as well as 
substantial oil, reserves,  but as Appendix A clearly 
shows the majority of these reserves are in the Russian 
Federation (both oil and gas), with Iran occupying 
second place in terms of gas reserves. Russia is the 
fossil-fuel powerhouse among the Soviet succes-
sor states, with 6.3 percent of the world’s proven oil 
reserves and 23.4 percent of its proven gas reserves. 
By contrast Turkmenistan has 4.3 percent of the world’s 
gas reserves, and Kazakhstan 3.2 percent of the world’s 
proven oil reserves.2   
The picture is slightly different with regard to oil 
reserves and development. As Appendix A-1 shows, Iran 
has the largest oil reserves of any Caspian state, second 
to Saudi Arabia internationally, with Russia in seventh 
place, having almost twice the reserves of ninth place 
Kazakhstan. Russia has alternated with Saudi Arabia for 
first place in annual production in recent years, coming 
second to them in 2008 production (see Appendix C-1). 
Ashgabat continues to upgrade its total reserves, 
buoyed by new fields that have been discovered in 
south eastern Turkmenistan3,  which include the South 
1  The author is a senior associate in the Russia/Eurasia Program at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
2  Kazakhstan has 1.0 percent of the world’s proven gas reserves and the fig-
ures for Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s proven oil reserves were unavailable. Uzbekistan 
has 0.9 percent of proven gas reserves, and Azerbaijan 0.6 percent of both oil and gas 
reserves, All figures from British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 
2009, http://www.bp.com/statistical review.
3  “Turkmenistan Announces Discovery of New Gas Field,” Eurasianet: 
Turkmenistan Daily Digest, March 16, 2007, http://eurasianet.org/resource/turkmenistan/
hypermail/200703/0001.shtml.
Iolathan-Osman gas field, a field confirmed as one of 
the world’s top five deposits in an independent audit 
by Gaffney, Cline and Associates. This field, which is 
estimated to contain between 4 and 14 trillion cubic 
meters of gas, is said to be able to gradually build to 70 
billion cubic meters (bcm) per year4  in production, and 
is generally not yet included in Turkmenistan’s proven 
reserves.
Proven reserves are only part of the story. The pace 
of development, the markets that they will serve and 
who will profit from their development served and who 
profits are also critical issues. 
As Appendix D-2 shows Russia’s production of 
conventional fuels is projected by the Energy Information 
Agency to remain relatively static between now and 
2015, and then increase only slightly between 2015 and 
20205.  By contrast Kazakhstan is primed to double 
its production figures in the next ten to fifteen years, 
as Appendix D-2 shows, crossing the 3 million barrel 
per day mark just after 2025. But even then, Russia is 
projected to produce roughly twice the conventional 
liquids of the other four post-Soviet states (Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) combined. 
There is a similar picture in the gas sector, where projec-
tions for 20306  show Russia’s likely annual yearly output 
of 760 billion cubic meters versus 306 bcm for the other 
four producers combined, with the greatest projected 
increases in production in Turkmenistan, which is 
expected to account for 118 bcm of production. 
 In the case of Russia’s reserves foreign oil and gas 
companies (international or national) have had difficul-
ties to gain development rights. Most of Kazakhstan’s 
major deposits have already been disposed of, albeit 
at best only partially developed, while Turkmenistan 
still remains the real prize7.  Yet the challenge here 
4  This is about 2,472 bcf per year.
5  Given the still only partly reformed character of Russia’s oil and gas indus-
try, the figures for 2015 may be overly optimistic, and the pace of economic reform more 
generally could lead Russia to reduce export volumes of both oil and gas.
6  Some experts have predicted that Russia’s gas production is likely to 
drop, due to Gazprom’s reluctance to invest in that sector, and that Russia will not meet 
announced targets for the development of new fields.  This could make the 2015 figures 
for gas overly optimistic, but the potential time lag in investment should not create serious 
challenge to the projected 2030 figures. 
7  “Turkmenistan Says Gas Field in World’s Top Five,” Radio Free Europe/
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has been for foreign firms to get rights of ownership 
for Turkmenistan’s on-shore reserves or favorable tax 
regimes for their development.
Then, of course, there is the challenge of trans-
port. Russia still serves as the dominant export route, 
although volumes transiting to Europe through Baku 
Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) and through China can both 
increase, with the netbacks through the Mediterranean 
higher for Kazakhstan. While the U.S. and EU have been 
pressing for more than a decade for the opening of new 
gas pipelines to connect European markets to Central 
Asian gas, to date the only success of this policy is the 
BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) pipeline which is moving 
Azerbaijani gas to Europe, but which lacks the capacity 
to  transport east Caspian gas. This gas would be an 
easy solution to the challenge of getting enough gas to 
fill the planned 31 bcm Nabucco gas pipeline, which 
would by-pass Russia8.  Small volumes of Turkmen gas 
can get through as a result of gas swaps across Iran, 
but Russia is still transporting between 45-65 bcm9  of 
gas annually, and is seeking to expand this capacity. The 
only current challenge to Russia’s monopoly is China, 
which is developing a new trans-Central Asian pipeline 
system. The new Chinese pipeline network, originating 
in Turkmenistan and ending at the Chinese border after 
crossing Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, will initially move 
10 bcm10  annually, expanding in stages up to 30 bcm11,  
and potentially could move twice that capacity. 
These routes are not able to move the potential 
maximum production from the region over the next fifty 
years, but provide roughly adequate coverage if the 
International Energy Agency and Energy Information 
Agency projections reproduced in Appendix D for 
2030 are achieved, especially if a 30 bcm pipeline 
linking Turkmenistan to the markets in Pakistan and 
India through Afghanistan (TAPI) is developed in this 
Radio Liberty, October 14, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkmenistan_Says_Gas_
Field_In_Worlds_Top_Five/1329670.html.
8  See Appendix G for a list of existing and proposed pipelines to move 
Central Asian oil and gas, and see page 4 for maps with the pipeline routes indicated.
9  This is equivalent to roughly 1,589-2,295 bcf.
10  This is 353.15 bcf.
11  This is 1,059.45 bcf.
timeframe. These projections are also interesting as 
they show the likely continued role of Uzbekistan as a 
regional producer, even though their reserves are at the 
declining end of their production curves12.   
This paper looks at the relative advantages and 
disadvantages the various interested actors have in 
increasing their position in the Caspian, and how and 
why the playing field for decision-making within the 
region has changed in recent years.
Russia’s Position in Caspian Markets
A major challenge that the Central Asian oil and gas 
producers have faced is that the Kremlin has long 
acted like Russia deserved special access to Caspian 
reserves, because of Soviet-era investments or planned 
new investments in them. Moscow has lacked both 
the capital and the technology necessary to acquire a 
commanding position in the ownership of assets outside 
of Russia, although at the same time the Kremlin has 
secured majority control over every deposit of strategic 
importance within Russia itself. Where Russian com-
panies have been effective, though, is monopolizing 
the transport of Central Asian oil and gas. However, 
the rapidly expanding role of China in the region has 
changed the terms of play for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan even more fundamentally than open-
ing BTC and a new link to Europe did for Azerbaijan, 
given the scale of the financial resources that China is 
prepared to spend in these countries. 
Russia has acquired some ownership of Caspian 
assets, particularly in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
albeit few major assets in the former13.  Much like 
Russia, Kazakhstan has also been consolidating the 
position of its national oil company, which has been 
increasing its ownership stakes in that country’s 
strategic reserves. Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and 
gas projects though are under foreign control. To date 
12  Uzbek gas experts continue to maintain that their country also has vast 
unproven gas reserves, and between now and 2030 they very much hope to be able to 
substantiate (or alternatively disprove) this.






























































Source: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, Energy Information Association, “Kazakhstan- Maps and Tables,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Kazakhstan/MapsTable.html, (accessed November 24, 2009).
Proposed and Existing Natural Gas Pipelines
Figure   
1
Source: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, Energy Information Association, “Kazakhstan- Maps and Tables,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Kazakhstan/MapsTable.html, (accessed November 24, 2009).
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Turkmenistan’s assets are still almost entirely under 
state control, and Russia has only a small and indirectly 
held (through Lukoil) stake in Azerbaijan’s reserves and 
transport.  
But geography, as well as the Soviet-era oil and gas 
pipeline system have made it easier for Russia to control 
the principal transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas 
(see map below). In general the Kremlin has been a 
hard bargainer setting the terms of transport for both 
oil and gas, but over the last several years it has been 
moving steadily to offering more of a market based price 
structure.
The Kazakhs ran into difficulties with the Russians 
early on, when the Kazakh government and Chevron 
tried to secure an agreement for the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) pipeline to move Tengiz oil to the 
port at Novorossisk. It took from 1992 to 1996 to reach 
a formal agreement, and then until 1998 for the TEOC 
(technical evaluation) to be approved by Moscow.  
Moscow’s continuing displeasure contributed to the slow 
implementation of the project, which was not completed 
until 2003. Russian interference in such projects was 
the driving force behind U.S. intervention to advocate for 
BTC and eventual Kazakh government interest in that 
pipeline route. 
Turkmenistan initially had the smoothest relationship 
with Russia, given the carry-over of leadership. From 
1995 through the joint venture TurkmenRosGaz, the 
production of natural gas was effortlessly produced 
and marketed throughout the CIS through the trading 
firm ITERA. This agreement broke down in 1997, when 
Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov dissolved 
TurkmenRosGaz and Gazprom responded by refusing 
to purchase Turkmenistan’s natural gas. Sales were 
renewed in 1998, in a part-cash, part-barter arrange-
ment directly between the Turkmen government 
and Gazprom. The Turkmen government routinely 
complained about how little cash they received, but 
President Niyazov would never fully commit to participat-
ing in a natural gas pipeline project to parallel the BTC 
line, to go from Baku to Erzerum via Tbilisi (known as 
BTE).
When Vladimir Putin was handed the reins of power 
from Boris Yeltsin at the close of 1999, the Caspian 
states were drawing closer to both the EU and NATO 
leading Putin to try and sweeten the terms of trade to 
improve Russia’s position on the energy front. A new 
marketing organization KazRosGaz was formed to 
move Karachaganak natural gas from Kazakhstan, 
creating the potential for securing a source of supply 
for Gazprom’s Orenburg refinery14.  The Kremlin also 
began strongly encouraging Russian firms to take equity 
stakes in projects in the Caspian states, with the implicit 
assumption that if these were not too commercially 
beneficial they could expect to receive compensations 
elsewhere. In response, Rosneft increased its activity 
in the Caspian Shelf section, taking a 25 percent stake 
in a joint venture with KazMunaiGaz to develop the 
Kurmangazy field in Kazakhstan in 2002, and originally 
setting the period for exploration from 2006 through 
201115.  Gazprom began to press more deeply into 
Uzbekistan, to help Tashkent ascertain the value of its 
unexplored gas assets and better utilize its aging fields. 
Gazprom also improved the terms of trade for transit of 
Turkmen gas across Uzbekistan in 2003.
Gazprom signed an agreement on strategic coop-
eration with Uzneftegaz in December 2002, which cov-
ers the purchase and transit of gas from 2003-2012, and 
then an agreement in 2005 that covered transit of gas 
across Uzbekistan through 2010, a PSA for rehabilitating 
the Shakhpaty field16  as well as several other projects17.  
But Kazakh-Russian energy relations remained strained 
over the issue of the expansion of the CPC pipeline, 
which was not settled until 200918.   
14  “KazRosGaz to Transport up to 4 bn cm of Gas in 2002,” Alexander’s Gas 
and Oil Connections 7, no. 15 (August 8, 2002), http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/
cnc23218.htm.
15  Rosneft, “Kurmangazy Structure (Kazakhstan),”
16  “Gazprom Agrees on Uzbek and Turkmen Gas Supply Terms for 2009,” Oil 
Voice, January 2, 2009, http://www.oilvoice.com/n/Gazprom_Agrees_on_Uzbek_and_
Turkmen_Gas_Supply_Terms_for_2009/b6578172.aspx.
17  “Uzbekistan gives Russian Gas Company Exploration License,” Eurasianet: 
Uzbekistan Daily Digest, January 18, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbeki-
stan/hypermail/200701/0007.shtml.
18  Convenient for the Russians, the Omanis put their 7 percent stake in 
the CPC pipeline up for sale in October 2008, which Moscow purchased, after having 





























































Had the Russians not held this project up, BTC 
might have had trouble getting enough volume to justify 
its expansion, but now the project has commitments 
from both TengizChevroil and Kashagan that at least 
part of their new production will be exported along this 
route. The Kazakhs finally signed a formal agreement 
in June 2006 with Azerbaijan to participate in the BTC 
pipeline project19.  In order to facilitate this in January 
2007 Kazmunaigaz entered an agreement with several 
international companies to construct the Kazakh 
Caspian Transport System, which would initially move 
25 million tons of oil per year and eventually move up 
to 38 million tons, first through a new pipeline to run 
from Eskene to Kuryk, then across the Caspian by ship 
from a new oil terminal, and then offloaded in Baku 
and sent through the BTC system20.  The Kazakhs also 
have plans to substantially increase the freight handling 
capacity of the port of Aktau to support this21.  
Moscow placed priority on improving its relation-
ship with Turkmenistan. In 2003, Gazprom negotiated 
a twenty-five year natural gas purchase agreement 
with Ashgabat, which was designed to transform these 
transactions from part-barter, part-cash to cash- based 
commercial contracts, with provisions for periodic 
renegotiations of the purchase price. However, in 
2005, Turkmenistan cut off deliveries for a few months 
in protest to what they described as unfair terms of 
trade. This made Putin very anxious to take advantage 
of Niyazov’s death (in December 2006), and when the 
three presidents gathered in May 2007 (in Turkmenbashi 
shareholder in the project, and in December 2008 they dropped their objections to CPC 
expansion, and expansion finally began moving forward in early 2009 with a target date of 
2011 for its completion. see Eric Watkins, “Oman Sells Its 7% Stake in CPC to Russia,” Oil 
and Gas Journal, November 7, 2008 and Caspian Pipeline Consortium, “CPC-R Extraordi-
nary General Shareholders Meeting Elected a New Board of Directors,” January 14, 2009, 
http://www.cpc.ru/portal/alias!press/lang!en-US/tabID!3552/DesktopDefault.aspx.
19  “BTC: Kazakhstan Finally Commits to the Pipeline,” Eurasianet, June, 19, 
2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav061906.shtml.
20  “Kazakhstan Signs Agreement on New Route for Caspian Oil Exports,” Eur-
asianet: Kazakhstan Daily Digest, January 29, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/
kazakhstan/hypermail/200701/0027.shtml. 
21  Kazmortransflot’s (Kazakhstan Maritime Transit Fleet) plans for 2008-2012 
call for the commissioning of five new 12,000-ton-plus oil freighters during 2009-2010, 
And despite the economic crisis, for the first quarter of 2009 the port exceeded its 
targeted plan for shipment of fuel oils by 110 percent, shipping 12,726,000 tons of fuel 
related freight. www.portaktau.kz 
Turkmenistan) Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
agreed to build a new pipeline to run along the Caspian 
coast, and to refurbish the smaller Soviet-era pipeline 
(no longer in use) that would lie alongside of it22.  The 
project is set to increase throughput capacity by some 
12 billion cubic meters23  by 2012. It is potentially inex-
pensive, especially if each partner funded its in-country 
construction costs, but has made little progress towards 
realization since 2007. 
In March 2008 the Russians offered the Kazakhs, 
Turkmen, and Uzbeks a new pricing formula, which 
promised “European” prices for 2009, with a compli-
cated averaging of Russian, CIS and European pricing, 
in large part to counter the competition posed by China, 
which has offered long-term purchase agreements for 
Turkmen natural gas with a commercial formula that was 
initially pegged at just under $200 per thousand cubic 
meters (tcm)24  plus a transit allowance. 
Originally, the three Central Asian countries had 
expectations of receiving upwards of $350 to $400 per 
tcm25  for 2008 and a 2009 price of between $301-
$350. The Uzbek price was said to be set by periodic 
recalculations, while the Turkmen apparently originally 
settled on a single price for the entire year, while the 
Kazakhs negotiated a European netback for 7 bcm from 
Karachaganak (paid to KMG) and 3 bcm on Ukrainian 
netback (80 percent of Europe prices)26  Most of 
Uzbekistan’s natural gas is sold in-region at much lower 
prices than Russia offers. Since 2006 Uzbekistan has 
been diverting more supply to Russia, but even the 16 
bcm can only be achieved by Uzbekistan reducing sup-
ply to its traditional Central Asian clients. But the Uzbeks 
also agreed (in September 2008) to sharing repair costs 
on the existing Central Asia-Center pipeline network 
through Uzbekistan with Gazprom, and expand capacity 
22  “Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan Plan New Gas Pipeline,” Eurasianet: 
Turkmenistan Daily Digest, May 14, 2007, http://eurasianet.org/resource/turkmenistan/
hypermail/200705/0005.shtml.
23  This is 423.78 bcf.
24  This is $200 per 35,315 cubic feet.
25  $350 to $400 per 35,315 cubic feet.
26  Siman Pirani “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Russian and CIS 






























































through Uzbekistan from 45 bcm per year to between 
80 and 90 bcm per year27.   
Moscow hoped that by cutting their margin on the 
sale of Central Asian gas in 2009, when European prices 
dropped, they could secure long-term advantage in the 
region28.  Gas deliveries from the former Soviet Union to 
the OECD countries in Europe were down 30.6 percent 
year on year for the first half of 200929,  with a drop in 
30 bcm in demand for Russian gas in the former Soviet 
Union, and a drop in domestic consumption of 20.3 
percent30.  But Gazprom’s initial reaction was to cut 
domestic production rather than slash gas purchases in 
Central Asia. 
By doing this Moscow hoped to secure develop-
ment rights to some deposits in Turkmenistan31,  as well 
as a long-term pricing agreement.  Moscow thought 
that they were very close to this, announcing after a 
March 25, 2009 Kremlin meeting between Presidents 
Medvedev and Berdymukhammedov, that the signing 
of such agreements was imminent32.  But no agreement 
was signed, and on April 9 there was a mysterious 
explosion in the CAC-4 pipeline on Turkmen territory. 
The Russians blamed it on poor maintenance by the 
Turkmen, but Ashgabat claimed that Gazprom shut 
down the line beyond Turkmenistan without warning, 
because Ashgabat refused to sell less gas for lower 
prices than had been previously negotiated33.  As a 
result of the explosion some 195 working wells were 
27  “Russia, Uzbekistan to Build Gas Pipe, Update Price Formula” Russian 
News and Information Agency Novosti, September 02, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/rus-
sia/20080902/116481407.html.  In terms of bcf this would expand capacity from 
1,589.175 bcf per year to between 2,825.2 and 3,178.35 bcf per year.
28  “Gazprom Squeezed By Central Asian Contracts,” Eurasianet, March 24, 
2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav032409d.shtml.  See 
also Pirani, 2009, pp. 24.
29  Pirani, 2009, pp. 3
30  Pirani, 2009, pp. 24.
31  Most of these were deposits are to support the “East-West” pipeline. This 
pipeline is expected to cost between $1.2 and $1.5 billion to complete, “Russian, Turk-
men Leaders Plan to Sign Gas Pipeline Deal at Next Meeting (Part 2),” Interfax, March 25, 
2009, http://www.interfax.com/3/482089/news.aspx.
32  “Russia, Turkmenistan to Sign New Gas Deals Soon- Medvedev,” 
Russian News & Information Agency Novosti, March 25, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/
world/20090325/120735442.html.
33  Bruce Pannier “Pipeline Explosion Raises Tensions between Turkmeni-
stan, Russia,” RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty, April 14, 2009, rferl.org/articleprint-
view/1608633.html.
shut in34,  and Turkmenistan stopped selling gas to 
Russia in retaliation. The gas trade between Russia and 
Turkmenistan was not resumed during 2009, because 
Ashgabat was unwilling to accept Moscow’s rumored 
offer of $222 per tcm for 2010, and Moscow refused to 
accede to Turkmenistan’s demand that their gas not be 
re-exported35.  At the very end of the year, though, the 
two sides reached agreement, albeit for a much smaller 
volume of gas, a maximum of only 30 bcm, with the net-
back figured out based on European purchase prices. 
While there are varying rumors on the value of the trans-
port cost that Gazprom is charging, estimates of what 
Ashgabat is going to receive (ranging from $195 tcm to 
$240-$250)36,  so this is a clear victory for the Turkmen 
side. While Moscow and Ashgabat might fight over what 
constitutes a fair price for transport, Gazprom has not 
accepted the idea that they can’t buy “discount” gas 
from the Turkmen, but must pay European price. Russia 
may not need more than 30 bcm for 2010 commitments 
in Europe, but by reducing the volume Moscow has let 
Ashgabat off the hook for supplying larger volumes in 
subsequent years, affectively abrogating the 25 year 
purchase agreement signed in 2005 (which set pur-
chase target of 58 bcm per year).  
One place where Russia’s position has improved is 
Azerbaijan, which is learning something about the rela-
tive lack of protection that multiple pipelines can afford. 
The Azerbaijani-Turkish relationship has grown more 
complex as a result of Turkey’s rapprochement with 
Armenia, which in turn is partly explained by Turkey’s 
improved relations with Russia. Closer cooperation in 
the gas sector is one area of improved Turkish-Russian 
relations. Turkey has signed on to South Stream (a new 
gas pipeline planned to under the Black Sea). Moreover, 
Russia and Turkey have agreed to construct a new 
pipeline across Anatolya linking the Black Sea port of 
34  Pirani, 2009, pp. 25
35  “Turkmenistan: Moscow Meeting Fails to Produce Energy Progress,” 
Eurasianet,  December 11, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/
eav113009a.shtml.
36  “Turkmenia vdvoe snizila tsenu no gaz dlia Gazrprom” RosBiznesKonsalt-
ing, December 23, 2009, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/23/12/2009/356857.shtml, and  






























































Samsun to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and so 
allowing Russian oil deliveries to by-pass the congested 
Turkish straits (Bosphorus). Their plans also include the 
joint construction of a new refinery in Ceyhan. The more 
gas that goes through Turkey, the tougher that Ankara 
can be in price setting with Baku down the road. 
The Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 seems 
to have stimulated Azerbaijan’s leadership to move 
in two directions, to consolidate its position with the 
Europeans but also to improve relations with Moscow. 
In October, Russia and Azerbaijan signed their most 
extensive memorandum in recent years, as part of a 
strategic framework governing gas relations between the 
two countries for 2010-2014, which obliges Azerbaijan 
to sell a minimum of only 500 million cubic meters of 
gas to Gazprom. In late December Azerbaijan further 
committed to sell a minimum of 1 bcm to Russia. The 
gas will transit along the old Soviet-era Baku-Novo Filya 
pipeline that runs south from Daghestan, with the flow 
now reversed. Sending larger volumes along this route 
would involve substantial investment in refurbishing and 
expanding the line, but the agreement opens the door 
for a much larger participation of Gazprom in the ship-
ment of gas from stage 2 of that project. It also offers 
Azerbaijan a highly attractive price of $350 per thousand 
bcm in 201037,  much higher than being offered in 
Central Asia, and nearly three times more than Turkey is 
reported paying for gas going through the BTE pipeline, 
from which they extract unusually high transit tariffs38.  
Of course the high price is being offered for a very small 
volume as something of an introductory sweetener, 
and the gas, by contract, must be used in the north 
Caucasus region of Russia, and not exported. 
37  Vladimir Socor, “Azerbaijan-Russia Gas Agreement: a Wakeup Call to Brus-
sels and Washington,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol 6, issue 127, July 2, 2009, http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35216.
38  Azerbaijan is reported to be receiving $120 per thousand cubic meters, 
and that Turkey has set transit prices at 70 percent more than the global average. See 
Gulmira Rzayeva, “Azerbaijan’s Diversified Energy Security Strategy” Central Asian-Cauca-
sus Institute Analyst, November 26, 2009, http://wwww.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/522.
China’s Position
 
China has dramatically increased its role in the Central 
Asian region in just over a decade of concentrated 
activity. Today, Chinese companies are becoming the 
dominant presence in Kazakhstan’s on-shore projects, 
displaying a financial might that has given them privi-
leged relationships which are unlike any ever offered 
to western firms in the region. Even more striking is 
Beijing’s role in Turkmenistan, where they appear to 
be largely replacing Russia as a gatekeeper for major 
projects in that country’s underdeveloped gas sector. 
China’s presence in Central Asia’s oil and gas 
sector dates from 1997, when the Chinese national 
oil company, CNPC, bought a 60.3 percent share of 
AktobeMunaigaz, and gained development rights to the 
oil field at Uzen, both in Kazakhstan, that same year. In 
2003 the Chinese upped their stake in AktobeMunaiGaz 
to 85.42 percent. These projects were to supply a 
jointly owned 2,900-kilometer oil pipeline from Atyrau to 
Alashankou on the Kazakh-Chinese border. 
A 2003 bid by China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) as well as China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) to buy British Gas’ 
share of Kazakhstan’s massive offshore Kashagan 
deposit in Kazakhstan though was blocked by the 
consortia partners. CNPC did manage to acquire the 
small North Buzachi field, and some other smaller 
assets, and then finally in 2005 CNPC purchased the 
assets of PetroKazakhstan, for $4 billion giving them the 
assets from the Kumkol field and shared control of the 
Shymkent refinery, but PetroKazakhstan was forced to 
turn over their shares in the Shymkent refinery (owned by 
PetroKazakhstan) to the Kazakh government39.  
The first link on the China Kazakh Crude Oil Pipeline 
was opened in 200540  and, by 2008, was transport-
39  To finalize the PetroKazakhstan deal, CNPC was forced to sell 33 percent 
of its stake in the firm to KazMunaiGaz. See Ian McKinnon, “PetroKazakhstan Holders 
Approve Bid,” International Herald Tribune, October 19, 2005. This deal also included 
CNPC’s sale of 50 percent of its stake in the Shymkent refinery to KazMunaiGaz. See 
Anna Shiryaevskaya, “KazMunaiGaz Completes Purchase of Shymkent Refinery from 
CNPC,” Platts Commodity News, November 17, 2006.
40  Plans for a China–Kazakh pipeline began to take shape in 1997 and were 





























































ing more than 5.6 million tons of crude, up from 4.8 
million tons in 200741.  In July 2009, the first phase of 
the branch from Kenkiyak to Kumkol was completed, 
and this portion of the pipeline now has the capacity 
to transport 10 million tons of oil per year42.  CNPC 
has also sponsored a 10 bcm line to give from western 
Kazakhstan to southern Kazakhstan (reducing the 
latter’s dependency upon Uzbek gas. China (Sinopec) 
also signed a $1 billion agreement with Kazmunaigaz to 
modernize the Atyrau refinery in October 2009, a project 
which is to be completed by 2013. 
Much more significant, China offered the Kazakhs 
some $10 billion in long-term credits to help that country 
get through its financial crisis.  Of that $3.3 billion went 
to a 50 percent share of MangistauMunaiGaz, $1.7 
billion as a loan to KazMunaiGaz, and $5 billion as a 
loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to Kazakhstan’s 
Development Bank which is to finance the non-oil and 
gas sectors of the economy43. 
China has also become the most prominent foreign 
investor in Turkmenistan. In April 2006, some eight 
months before his death, President Saparmurad Niyazov 
and President Hu Jintao signed a framework agreement 
providing for the construction of a new pipeline that 
would carry 30 billion cubic meters44  of Turkmen natural 
gas annually across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and 
Kazakhstan to China, and which offered the Chinese the 
pipeline is not set to reach full capacity until 2011. See Xinhua/AP, “China–Kazakhstan 
Pipeline Starts to Pump Oil,” China Daily, December 15, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/english/doc/2005-12/15/content_503709.htm.
41  The 2008 figure represents the amount transported from January to No-
vember 2008. See “Transportirovka nefti po truboprovodu Atasu-Alashan’kou v yanvare-
noyabre 2008 goda uvelichilas’ bolee chem na 25%,” Kazakhstan Today, December 22, 
2008, http://www.kt.kz/index.php?act=arch&lang=rus&uin=1133167983&chapter=11
53472110&n_date=2008-12-22. For the 2007 figure, see “Kazakhstan to Boost Crude 
Supply to China,” The Standard, September 24, 2008, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/
breaking_news_detail.asp?id=6616&icid=1&d_str=20080924.
42  “CNPC Starts Operating Kenkiyak–Kumkol Section of Kazakhstan–China Oil 




43  The Chinese credit has terms of 10-15 years, with the money provided to 
KazMunaiGaz at a soft rate, of the remaining funds $3.5 billion must be spent on Chinese 
exported goods and are at Libor + 3.5 percent, and the remaining  $1.5 billion is at 
Libor + 5.5 percent. Kulpash Konyrova, “Samruk-Kazyna becomes Kazakhstan’s internal 
investor: so says Kelimbetov” New Europe, June 7, 2009, issue 837, www.neuope.eu/
articles/94588.php.
44  This is equivalent to 1,059.45 billion cubic feet.
opportunity to develop green field projects as necessary 
to meet this new capacity. In the subsequent agree-
ments which formalized this arrangement China was 
the right to develop green field projects as a joint license 
holder, something that has not been offered to Russian 
or to the western IOCs.
China quickly set to building a pipeline along 
this route, while Russia’s Stroytransgaz is building 
a complementary 188 km spur costing $400 million 
to take gas from fields near the Turkmen fields along 
the Amu Darya River through central Uzbekistan and 
southern Kazakhstan, entering China in the Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region45.  The first stage of the 
7000 km pipeline was commissioned in December 
2009, the Uzbek section is virtually complete and the 
Kazakh portion is to be completed by June 2010. The 
opening of the first phase was marked by a ceremony in 
which Chinese President Hu Jintao and the presidents 
of all three Central Asian countries along the route 
participated. The pipelines under construction could 
be increased to allow the transit of 50 bcm of gas from 
Central Asia to China, 40 bcm (up for the original plan of 
30 bcm) from Turkmenistan, with the additional 10 bcm 
to come from Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan.  
While Turkmenistan continues to talk with western 
“majors” about the development of both on-shore and 
off-shore parcels46,  Ashgabat has not been willing to 
offer western companies ownership rights or produc-
tion-sharing agreements (PSAs) for those choice parcels 
which are located on land. In contrast, the Turkmens 
have signed a PSA with CNPC for the development of 
the Bagyyarlyk field in eastern Turkmenistan, with gas 
reserves of 1.7 trillion cubic meters47.   
But the big prize is the south Iolathan field, which 
45  “Construction Commences of Central Asia Gas Pipeline’s Uzbek Section,” 
China National Petroleum Corporation, July 2, 2008, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/eng/press/
newsreleases/Constructioncommencesof
CentralAsiaGasPipelinesUzbeksection_.htm.
46  Breffni O’Rourke, “Central Asia: Putin Visits Energy-Rich Kazakhstan, Turk-
menistan,” Radio Free Europe./Radio Liberty,  May 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1076371.html.
47  “Turkmenistan Allows China to Develop Gas Field Near Uzbekistan,” 
Eurasianet, July 20, 2007, reproduced by Oil and Gas Eurasia, http://www.oilandgaseur-
asia.com/news/p/0/news/808. In addition Sinopec has a small modernization project of 





























































both Russia and the western IOCs appear to be losing 
out on. In June 2009 CNPC offered Ashgabat $3 billion 
loan, to allow Turkmenistan to expand development 
plans for south Iolathan field, but the timing obviously 
helped the Turkmen to cope with the loss of revenue 
(calculated at roughly $1 billion per month for April-Dec 
2009)48  that they suffered by breaking off gas sales with 
Russia. As this paper was going to press, the Turkmen 
government (on December 30, 2009) announced that it 
was awarding a $9.7 billion contract to an international 
consortium of CNPC, South Korea’s LG International, 
Hyundai Engineering, UAE’s Gulf Oil and Gas, and 
Petrofac. As China’s State Development Bank is financ-
ing all aspects of the project it is a safe conclusion that 
the gas from this giant field will head east.
Western IOCs and the Future 
of Caspian Reserves
The Western IOCs may well have lost their best oppor-
tunity to pick up major assets in the Caspian region, 
and may not be able to get additional gas for the 
Nabucco pipeline from the east Caspian (Turkmenistan 
or Kazakhstan). While there has been steady interest 
from the U.S. and now increasingly from the EU to have 
Turkmen and Kazakh gas transit under the Caspian, 
there has never been a serious western government 
or IOC initiative to compensate Turkmenistan from a 
Russian boycott of Turkmen gas should that govern-
ment sign on to shipping gas in an undersea pipeline. 
Kazakhstan’s calculations were always more complex, 
given their long border with Russia and their depend-
ence upon the Russian oil and gas transport system. 
From off-the-record accounts of some of those 
engaged in pipeline discussions, the late Turkmen leader 
seems to have had two sets of concerns, how much 
volume could be moved from alternative routes and how 
could Turkmenistan compensate for a loss of revenue 
during the period of construction of a route which Russia 
48  “Russia, Turkmen Leaders Meet, No Word on Gas” Reuters India, November 
29, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-44325820091129.
refused to sanction.  
While President Niyazov dithered on the question 
of committing to an undersea TransCaspian pipeline to 
connect Turkmenistan, Berdymukhammedov quickly 
signaled that he was foreclosing no pipeline options. 
Ironically, China’s new role in Turkmenistan took away 
some of the risk factor of shipping gas (against Russia’s 
will) westward to Europe. And for the Europeans this 
appeared to come at a very good time, when powerful 
advocates of the Nabucco pipeline project, an $11.3 bil-
lion 3300 km (2050 miles) pipeline to run from Erzurum 
via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to a natural gas hub 
in Austria49.  This project is supported by an intergov-
ernmental agreement of the affected states, dating from 
July 2009, and has the endorsement of the EU, but for 
the moment it only has commitments for 8 bcm of Shah 
Deniz (Azerbaijani) gas to fill what is expected to be a 16 
bcm pipeline at the start, with an eventual capacity of 31 
bcm per year.  Plans now call for construction to start in 
2011 with delivery in 2014.
Improved Turkmen-Azerbaijani relations made the 
prospect of creating a de facto undersea pipeline linking 
a number of Caspian shelf projects more plausible. The 
Turkmen-Azeri relationship improved steadily in 2008, 
with President Berdymukhammedov making his first 
official visit to Azerbaijan in May 2008, foreshadowing a 
breakthrough on the disputed ownership of the Kapaz/
Serdar offshore field, and increasing the likelihood that 
this project will be jointly developed by the two coun-
tries50,  although the relationship between Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan is still not on firm footing. Joint devel-
opment of this project, which will be linked to Baku by a 
small off-shore pipeline, would facilitate a small (8 bcm) 
pipeline linking off-shore Turkmen and Azeri projects to 
each other, and then in turn to the BTE pipeline in Baku.   
Since the April 2009 pipeline explosion 
49  For a fuller explanation of the project, which is controlled by a consortium 
of BOTAS AS, BULGARIAN ENERGY HOLDING EAD, MOL Plc, OMV Gas & Power GmbH, 
RWE AG and  TRANSGAZ S.A see the consortium project website: http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/.
50  Rovshan Ismaiyilov, “Azerbaijan Sees Positive Signs for Energy Partnership 






























































Berdimukhammedov has shown little concern for 
Russian sensibilities, making it clear that Turkmenistan 
will accept those overtures that are designed to get 
Turkmen gas to the European market by-passing Russia, 
providing that the proposals are designed to produce 
enhanced short or medium access rather than just long-
term gain.
In late 2009 Ashgabat signed an agreement with 
Germany’s RWE to develop an off-shore bloc, knowing 
that the latter (which is part of the Nabucco project) 
intends to link up any gas it finds with deposits in the 
Azerbaijani sector, in order to support 10-15 bcm of 
export to Europe annually (through a pipeline connec-
tor system under the Caspian sea)51.  Turkmenistan is 
also increasing its gas shipments to Iran, by providing 8 
bcm per year to Korpeje to KordKui pipeline and adding 
a small bcm pipeline from Dauletebad to the Iranian 
border.
The Italian IOC ENI is also in discussions with 
Turkmenistan both about transporting Turkmen gas 
through Turkey into Italy from an undetermined route 
(which the MOU makes clear is neither South Stream nor 
Nabucco), and also about participating in some capacity 
in the transport of Turkmen gas through Afghanistan to 
India and Pakistan52.  ENI has a close working relation-
ship with Gazprom, with whom it is partnering in the 
South Stream project, and this raises questions as to 
whether ENI’s evolving relationship with Gazprom will 
somehow eventually work to the latter’s advantage in 
Turkmenistan.
This could be reminiscent of the position that the 
French IOC Total is developing in Kazakhstan. During 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s October 2009 trip to 
Kazakhstan, the first by a French president, some $6 
billion in contracts were signed by French and Kazakh 
companies.  France’s Areva and Kazatomprom agreed 
to set up a joint venture to market nuclear fuel in Asia, 
51  Marat Gur, “Interview-RWE sees Turkmen Nabucco deal in H1 2010,” 
Reuters News, December 8, 2009, http://www.forexyard.com/en/reuters_inner.
tpl?action=2009-12-07T130828Z_01_GEE5B6139_RTRIDST_0_RWE-TURKMENISTAN-
INTERVIEW.
52  “Eni Mulls Turkmen Gas Transit Via Turkey To Italy,”  Wall Street Journal, 
December 1, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091201-708039.html.
and a French firm (Entrepose Contracting) got the con-
tract to build the Yeskene-Kuryk pipeline which will con-
nect oil from the Kashagan field with the port at Aktau. 
But Total also signed on to the Khvalynskoe gas field 
project, a joint venture of LUKOIL and KazMunaiGaz, 
which will eventually produce 8 bcm of gas and conden-
sate for processing in Russia53.  
While some European firms are trying to juggle their 
interests in the Caspian with those in Russia to the ben-
efit of their balance sheets by selling through routes that 
bypass Russia as well as those that go through it, the 
leading American firms may well be trying to develop a 
Turkmen strategy that takes advantage of their business 
dealings in China, but there may no longer be a future 
in this. For example, Chevron has been pressing for a 
share in Turkmenistan’s giant South Iolathan field, but no 
western IOC was included in that consortium.
India’s Energy Demands
By contrast to China, it is going to be very difficult for 
India to make effective use of Central Asia’s oil and gas 
reserves to help meet its growing energy needs. While 
India has interest in gaining access to Caspian reserves 
it has entered this market quite late. In large part this 
is because of the transport challenges that India faces 
in getting gas on land based routes that cross either 
Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
In 2008 India came on board as a full member of 
the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Pakistan (TAP) Pipeline 
project, now renamed TAPI, to mark New Delhi’s inclu-
sion in this gas project. India also has signed a MoU with 
Turkmenistan (in April 2008) for cooperation in the gas 
sector. India is also a supporter of a competing project, 
the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Pipeline54,  which would 
run from the South Pars field in Iran to Gujarat in India, 
but pricing as well as security are concerns with this 
route. Whichever project receives funding first is likely to 
53  “Wrapup 2- Sarkozy Clinches $6 billion of Kazakh Energy Deals,” Reuters, 
October 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL654063420091006.
54  Gazprom has signed an agreement giving it the right to engage in the 





























































Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.
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2008 Caspian Proved Gas Reserves

























































































create a major damper on potential commercial interest 
in the other, however both are plagued by the security 
challenges of shipping across Afghanistan, and the IPI 
project also has pricing disagreements between the 
major partners.  
ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) has a 25 percent share in 
the off-shore Satpaev block (with 1.75 billion barrels of in 
place oil reserves), partnering with majority owner KMG. 
Originally they were to exercise their ownership through 
OMEL, their joint venture with Mittal Energy Ltd55,  but 
Mittal withdrew from the project in November 2009. OVL 
had been trying to gain ownership stakes in 3 off-shore 
Caspian blocks since 2007.  
How Are Caspian Reserves 
Integrated with Other Markets
 
For the last fifteen years there has been a great deal of 
international competition for control of the assets of the 
Central Asian region. But turning the question around 
it is useful to ask whether these assets are significant 
enough to sustain especially in a business environment 
in which the nations involved demanded larger roles for 
their own national oil companies of sector. There is no 
question that these assets are significant. Kazakhstan 
will be a medium sized producer in the global oil indus-
try, and Turkmenistan could have a similar role in the gas 
sector, but their assets still pale in comparison to those 
of Russia, and unlike Russia these countries are land-
locked with limited ability to independently parlay their 
assets in some sort of regional consortium. All (including 
Azerbaijan) will be dependent upon the good will of the 
more powerful transit states that they border on, Turkey, 
Russia, China, and possibly eventually Iran.  And none of 
these states will be powerful enough to juggle the inter-
ests of these various actors off against one and another, 
but each will have to hope that no one state is ever fully 
able to dominate the transit market place.
55  “ONGC gets nod to partner LN Mittal for Satpayev stake buy”  LiveMint.com 
Lounge, July 31, 2009,
 http://www.livemint.com/2009/07/31165752/ONGC-gets-nod-to-partner-LN-Mi.html.
Transport out of the region is expensive and remains 
challenging, and the governments in the region are 
tough and increasingly more sophisticated negotiators, 
and neither Kazakhstan nor Turkmenistan have been 
willing to negotiate new production sharing agree-
ments in recent years (except for the CNPC deal in 
Turkmenistan). While Kazakhstan initially was willing to 
turn over control of its assets almost entirely to foreign 
control, Kazakhstan’s leaders have gotten much more 
adept at carving out a role for Kazakh companies, and 
in particular for KazMunaiGaz. The Turkmen have been 
less investor friendly all along and have tried to retain all 
the ownership of on-shore assets.
No doubt Central Asia’s oil will likely always find its 
way to market. However, the pacing of Kazakhstan’s 
largest projects will depend upon the challenges of 
transport being successfully resolved. The timing of 
later stages of all of these projects will also be made to 
reflect favorable ratios of production and transport costs 
to potential profit. This was the case with Tengiz, which 
is now a point of tension between Kazakhstan and the 
consortium partners in Karachaganak, and is certain 
to be an ongoing challenge with Kashagan. As a land-
locked country Kazakhstan has no really good alterna-
tives. Azerbaijan and Russia are competing producers, 
and the netbacks from the Pacific routes tend to be 
lower than through the Mediterranean. 
The region’s gas industry faces even larger chal-
lenges. The international gas industry is in a state of flux. 
The IEA predicts the under-utilization of pipeline capacity 
combined with increases in the amount of LNG available 
will create a global glut that will rise from 60 bcm in 2007 
to close to 200 bcm by 2012-201556.  With the dramatic 
increase in the LNG available for European markets 
making the higher priced gas sold by Russia through 
pipelines very much less attractive.
Russia is fighting hard to ensure that its customers’ 
gas prices remain pegged to those of oil, but it is likely 
to have trouble doing this when its long-term contracts 
56  Interational Energy Agency, “IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 Fact Sheet: 






























































in Western Europe eventually expire57.  While many 
Western European countries are going to be tied to the 
Russian pipeline system for years to come58  even they 
have flexibility as to the minimum amount of gas that 
they are contractually obligated to buy from Russia. 
Simon Pirani of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
argues that European gas demands for 2020 will be 
considerably less than originally planned, and Russian 
experts now estimate only 168 bcm annually for 2020-
2025 rather than an earlier figure of 220-22559.  Russia is 
already moving to reorient much of their new production 
to LNG, but that is a subject for a different paper.
While Russia is hoping to use the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum as a way to constrict supplies and 
to maintain higher prices similar to OPEC60,  they will 
face an uphill battle to achieve this. Lower gas prices 
for Russia will surely be passed down to Central Asian 
producers, who are also unlikely to be better served by 
other markets. 
With time, increasing amounts of Caspian gas will 
also find their way to Europe by routes that bypass 
Russia. But the Europeans have diminished any 
advantage that they might have had in this region by the 
EU’s inability to advance any coherent energy policy, a 
policy which could trump the conflicting strategies of 
the various EU member states. In the end the individual 
national strategies have been far more important, creat-
ing German support for Nordstream and other Russian 
initiatives, and shaping the priorities of France and Italy 
as well. In the end, though, there is the serious question 
of how many pipelines to Europe can be supported in 
the long-run and whether the European pipelines will 
leave the Caspian producers with higher netbacks than 
57  For example gas deliveries to Romania are covered by a contract that 
runs until 2011, the contract with the Czech Republic runs until 2013, the contract with 
Hungary until 2015 and the one with Poland until 2022.
58  Vladimir Kirillov, “Gas Exports from Russia,” http://www.ecn.nl/fileadmin/
ecn/units/bs/ENGAGED/120603-kirillov.pdf.
59  Siman Pirani, “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Russian and CIS 
Gas Markets,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November 2009, NG 36 http://www.
oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG36.pdf, p.15
60  Leonid V. Bokhanovsky was elected secretary general of the organization 
of 11 member nations in December 2009. Members are Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Nigeria, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. Kazakhstan 
and Norway are observers.
they are getting from Russia or China. As Appendix H 
makes clear, Turkey is likely to become an increasingly 
more powerful gate keeper for deciding the profit level of 
Caspian gas exports, depending upon how quickly new 
sources of gas begin transiting through Turkey.
China will have an even larger buyer’s advantage in 
several years when the new pipeline to China is at full 
capacity, and Beijing is likely to bristle at having to pay 
substantially more to Central Asian producers than it 
does for other forms of energy, and China’s domestic 
energy market is also not pegged to market prices. Not 
only is gas more expensive than coal, but its cost will 
have to reflect favorably to LNG bought on long term 
contracts. While natural gas currently meets only 3 per-
cent of that country’s energy needs, it is projected to rise 
to 10 percent by 2020, by which time China expects to 
have doubled its domestic natural gas supply. 
It remains to be seen how China will use the power 
that it is accumulating in the oil and gas sectors of the 
three east Caspian states. Caspian oil will only make a 
relatively small contribution to sating China’s growing 
energy needs, and will offer little protection against 
closure of the Straits of Mallaca. Caspian gas can help 
meet energy needs in Xinjiang and facilitate planned 
industrial growth in that contentious area of China, 
but alternative and cheaper sources for energy could 
have been found. The fervor with which Beijing is going 
into the Caspian market suggests that the prize that 
they seek is at least as much geopolitical equity if not 
dominance in this region. This does not mean that China 
will behave like a hegemonic power in the region, or that 
they have any interest in the kind of economic integration 
that Russia has proposed to these same states. What 
the rise of China means is that despite waning Russian 
influence, Western IOCs and their governments will still 



































































































































Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.
Percent Share of 2008 Proved Oil Reserves for Europe/Eurasia
Appendix 
B-1
Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*Conventional liquids include crude oil and lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and refinery gain.

































































Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.
Gas Production (bcm) 1985-2008
Appendix 
E
Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.































































Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.
Gas Production and Consumption (bcm) 
Appendix 
F
Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
















































































































Tengiz, Kazakhstan – 
Novorossiysk, Russia 1.34 million b/d 1,580
Atyrau-Samara Pipeline Kazakhstan -Russia 0.6 million b/d 691
Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Baku, Azerbaijan- Tbilisi, 
Georgia - Ceyhan, Turkey 1 million b/d 1,780
Karachaganak-Atyrau Kazakhstan 0.14 million b/d 635
Baku-Novorossiysk
(AIOC Northern Route)
Baku, Azerbaijan – 
Novorossiysk, Russia 0.12 million b/d 1,400
Baku-Novorossiysk
(Chechnya bypass)
Baku, Azerbaijan – 
Novorossiysk, Russia - 283
Baku-Supsa
(AIOC Western Route)
Baku, Azerbaijan – Supsa, 





Dushanzi, China 0.2 million b/d 987
Kenkiyak-Orsk Abtyubinsk, Kazakhstan – 
Orsk, Russia 0.13 million b/d 400
Kenkiyak-Atyrau Kazakhstan 0.24 million b/d 448






20 billion cu m/year 1175
Central Asia-Center Gas 
Pipeline
Turkmenistan- Uzbekistan- 




– Russia – Novopskov, 
Ukraine
18 billion cu m/year 328
Soyuz Gas Pipeline Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Ukraine 28.3 billion cu m/year 424
Data Source:  “Country Analysis Briefs,” Energy Information Agency, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/index.html.
“General Information,” Caspian Pipeline Consortium, 
http://www.cpc.ru/portal/alias!press/lang!en-us/tabID!3357/DesktopDefault.aspx.
SRI, “KazTransOil and Transneft to Expand the Atyrau-Samara Pipeline,” Silk Road Intelligencer, 
July 10, 2008, http://silkroadintelligencer.com/2008/07/10/kaztransoil-and-transneft-to-expand-the-atyrau-samara-pipeline/.
“Kazkahstan: Oil,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Kazakhstan/Oil.html.
“Doing Business in Kazakhstan: Oil and Gas,” Ministry for Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Department of European Affairs,” http://ozs.mofcom.gov.cn/table/
kaza/oil&gas.pdf, pp. 2.
Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff, “Caspian Natural Gas? 1: Kazakh export plans affect regional producers, buyers,” Oil & Gas Journal, January 9, 2009.
Andrew Reed, “Coming from Russia: More Crude, Lighter, and Sweeter,” Oil & Gas Journal, August 10, 2009, pp. 21.







































































31 billion cu m/
year 3,300 2015 $11 billion
South Stream Beregovaya, 
Russia - Italy
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40 billion cu/m 
year 7,000 2012 $7.3 billion
Data Source: Simon Pirani ed., Russian and CIS Gas Markets and Their Impact on Europe, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009) pp. 300.
Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, http://nabucco-pipeline.com/.
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Data Source: “Turkey: Natural Gas,” U.S. Energy Information Agency, April 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Turkey/NaturalGas.html.
Turkey’s Gas Transit Potential Breakdown
Appendix 
H
Primary Energy Demand includes: Coal, Oil, Gas, Nuclear, Hydro, Biomass and waste, and other renewables.
Data Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, 2009, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.

































































JV to develop 6-9 billion barrels of oil reserves at the Tengiz and Korolev fields. 
Owned by ChevronTexaco (US), Exxon-Mobil (US), KazMunaiGaz (Kazakhstan), 
LukArco (US and Russia).
Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC)
The partners are Transneft (Russia), KazMunaiGaz (Kazakhstan Pipeline Venture, 
Kazakhstan), ChevronTexaco, Exxon-Mobil, Oman, LukArco, BP (UK), Rosneft 
(Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell (UK and Netherlands), British Gas (UK), Agip (ENI Italy), 
and Oryx (US). The project aims to build and operate 1.4 million barrels per day 




Development of Karachaganak oil and gas condensate field, which contains more 




Development of Karachaganak oil and gas field with 2.3–6 billion recoverable barrels 
of oil and gas condensate reserves and 16–46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural 
gas reserves. Owned by Agip, British Gas, Chevron, and LUKoil.
AgipKCO, previously 
known as Offshore 
Kazakhstan International 
Operating Company 
(OKIOC) (In January 2009, 
North Caspian Operating 
Company, or NCOC, will 
take over the project with 
the same partners)
Oil exploration projects at Kashagan South West (SW), Aktote, Kairan, Kalamkas (gas 
and oil condensate 953.1 billion cubic feet) discoveries, and the Kashagan deposit, 
the world’s biggest oil discovery since 1968 with estimated oil reserves of 9–13 billion 
barrels recoverable (up to 38 billion probable) and 10.219 trillion cubic feet of proven 
gas reserves. The JV partners are KazMunaiGaz, Agip, Exxon-Mobile, Royal Dutch/
Shell, TotalFinaElf (France), Phillips Petroleum (US), and Inpex (Japan).
China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) 
AktobeMunaiGaz (in 
partnership with Access 
Industries (US))
Development of Zhanazhol, Kenkiyak Oversalt and Kenkiyak Subsalt oil fields in 
Aktobe, estimated 1.17 billion barrels of oil reserves and 4.695 trillion cubic feet of gas 
resources. New field Umit was discovered in 2005.
Kuatamlonmunai (KAM) 
Project
Developing the Konys and Bektas Oil Field in central Kazakhstan’s Turgay Basin with 
remaining reserves of 113 million barrels. Owned by CNPC, China North Industries 
Corporation, and ZhenHau Oil (China), and Amlon (UK).
PetroKazakhstan Kumkol 
Resources (previously 
known as Hurricane-Kumkol 
Munai) (China)
JV between CNPC and KazMunaiGaz. Development and exploration in the South 
Tugai basin, including Kumkol Field, which is believed to contain about 429 million 
barrels of crude oil, and Shymkent refinery, the largest in Kazakhstan. 
Kumkol-LUKoil (under 
PetroKazakhstan, China)
Development of South Kumkol field with proven reserves of 116 million barrels of oil 
and total estimated reserves of more than 600 billion barrels.
Turgai Petroleum (China) JV between PetroKazakhstan and LUKoil to perform exploration of North Kumkol field 
with estimated reserves of 97–300 million barrels of oil.
KazGerMunai (KGM) (China)
JV between PetroKazakhstan Kumkol Resources and KazMunaiGaz to develop 
Akshabulak and Nuraly oil fields in the Kyzyl-Orda region in the center of Kazakhstan, 
which has estimated oil reserves of 100 million barrels.
Chevron Texaco North 
Buzachi Inc. (China)
Exploration of North Buzachi oil field with estimated 1-1.5 billion barrels of oil. Owned 
by CNPC and LUKoil.
MangistauMunaiGas  JV between KazMunaiGaz and CNPC that includes 36 oil and gas fields controlling an 
estimated 500 million barrels of oil reserves.
UzenMunaiGaz  Developing Uzen and Aktyubinsk fields with estimated oil reserves of 2.5 billion 
barrels. Owned by KazMunaiGaz and CNPC.
AO KazMunaiTeniz Offshore 
Oil Company
Production sharing contract to operate in Kurmangazy oil field with estimated 
reserves of 2.2–8.8 billion barrels of oil. Owned by KazMunaiGaz with some shared 
owned by Rosneft.

































































KarazhanbasMunai JSC  JV between Nations Energy (Canada) under Chinese CITIC group to develop 
Karazhanbas oil field with estimated reserves of 400 million barrels of oil.
ADA Group (Korea)
JV between Korean National Oil Corp (KNOC), LG International Corp (Korea), Roxi 
Petroleum (UK), and Vertom (Netherlands) for exploration and development of Aktobe 
(1.17 billion barrels of oil reserves), including Zhanatan, Bashinkol, Egizkara fields.
Demunai (U.S.) Developments of fields in Aktobe. JV owned by Caesar Oil (US) and KazMunaiGaz.
EmbaMunaiGaz (Hungary)
JV partners are Kazakhoil-Emba (Kazakhstan), MOL Rt (Hungary), Vegyepszer 
(Hungary). Development of Emba fields: 27 oil fields with total estimated reserves of 
500 million barrels.
KarakudukMunai (LUKoil, 
Russia) Development of Karakuduk oil field with estimated oil reserves of 63 million barrels.
Khvalinskoye JV 
A parity JV between LUKoil, KazMunaiGaz, Total (France), and GDF Suez (US) to 
develop Khvalynskoe oil field, a conventional gas condensate field on the border 
between Kazakhstan and Russia, with estimated reserves of 400 million barrels of oil 
and 12.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
TsentrCaspneftegaz (Russia)
JV between Gazprom, LUKoil, and KazMunaiGaz for deepwater exploration and 
development of Tsentralnoye oil and gas structure in the North of Caspian Sea shelf 
with recoverable reserves estimated at 6.0436 trillion barrels of fuel equivalent and 




The project Tyub-Karagan is aimed at conducting geological-prospecting works 
at section Tyub-Karagan, located in the central part of Kazakhstan sector of the 
Caspian Sea, and with estimated reserves of 7 billion barrels of oil. Owned by JSC 
Offshore Oil Company KazMunayTeniz (Kazakhstan) and LUKoil Overseas Shelf B.V. 
(Russia).
Satpayev Oil Block (India)
JV between KazMunaiGaz and ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd (ONGC Videsh and Mittal 
Investment Sarl, India) for exploration and production of the Satpayev field in the 
north of the Caspian Sea with estimated 1.85 billion barrels of oil.
Zhambyl Petroleum Block 
(Korea)
MOU signed between KazMunaiGaz, KNOC, SK Corporation, LG Corporation, 
Daesung, and Samsung (Korea) for development of Zhambyl oil field on the Caspian 
Sea with estimated 1.26 billion barrels of oil.
Pearls Block 
(Zhemchuzhina)
JV owned by Shell, KazMunaiGaz, and Oman Oil Company. Crude discovery officially 
confirmed in 2007. Zhemchuzhina field is located in North Caspian (sea depth ranges 
from 24 to 30 feet) and has 733 million barrels of estimated oil reserves.
Kazakoil-Aktobe (KOA) 
(Canada)
JV between Nelson Resources (Canada) and KazMunaiGaz. Production of oil in 
northwestern Kazakhstan from the Alibekmola Field that has proven and probable 
reserves of about 239 million barrels, with an additional 168 million barrels classified 
as possible, and Kozhasai Field with 91 million barrels of recoverable oil reserves.
Tasbolat Oil (Romania)
JV between Petrom (Romania) and KazMunaiGaz. Developing Tasbolat fields is 
72 million barrels of proven and probable recoverable oil and 65 million barrels of 
possible recoverable reserves, as well as Aktas and Turkenoy fields.
ADM Project (CNPC, China) Exploration of Aryss and Blinov blocks with reserves estimated at 73.3 million barrels 
of petroleum.
Arman (UK and Netherlands, 
Russia)
JV between Royal Dutch Shell and LUKoil. Developing Arman field near Aktau with 
estimated reserves of 26.7545 million barrels of oil and 2.6122 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas.
Shagyrly-Shomyshty (U.S.)
JV between American International Kazakhstan (under American International 
Petroleum Corporation, US), and KazMunaiGaz to develop License 1551 (the 
Shagyryl-Shomyshty field) in western Kazakhstan with technically proved reserves of 
604 billion cubic feet of gas and approximately 1.2 trillion cubic feet of gas in place.
Tenge (U.S.)
JV owned by Anglo-Dutch Petroleum (US) and KazMunaiGaz. Developing Tenge 































































Sazankurak Joint Venture 
Joint Stock Company (SJV) 
(U.S.)
Exploration and development of hydrocarbon deposits in the Caspian region of 
Central Asia (including Chinarevskoe gas oil and Sazankurak oil field). The total 
proved reserves of the two fields exceed 242 million barrels of oil, and joint daily 
output is 4,000 barrels. Partners are First International Oil Corporation (FIOC) (US), 
Atryraumunaigasgeologia (AMG) (Kazakhstan), and IFC (loan and quasi-equity).
KazakhTurkMunai (Turkey)
JV partners are Kazzarubejgeologia, KazMunaiGaz, and Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
(TPAO) (Turkey). Developing the southeast and northeast Saztobe and West Yelemes 
fields and participating in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC Pipeline).
Pavlodar Oil refinery (China 
and Indonesia)
Constructed in 1978, the largest and most modern refining facility in Kazakhstan, it 
currently has capacity of about 5 million tons of crude oil per year. This is almost 30% 
below its original capacity of 7 million tons because of wear and poor maintenance. 
Even then, the plant does not operate at full capacity and refined only 31.299 million 
barrels of crude oil in 2008. JV between MangistauMunaiGaz (Kazakhstan and China) 
and Central Asia Petroleum (Indonesia).
Condor Petroleum (EurAsia 
Resource Holding AG, 
Austria)
Exploration of West Zharkamys (in the prolific North Caspian Basin, where more 
than 45 billion barrels of oil equivalent have been discovered), Marsel (in southern 
Kazakhstan, in an under-explored structural basin), and East Aral territories. 
Arawak Energy (Vitol Group, 
Switzerland)
Operates four producing blocks (Akzhar, Besbolek, Karataikyz, and Alimbai) and two 
exploration blocks (East Zharkamys III and Tamdykol).
Temir Block (Denmark and 
Switzerland)
JV between Maersk Oil and Arawak Energy. Exploration of Temir Block located 62.1 
miles south of Aktobe in the western part of Kazakhstan (2000–2004), the Saigak Field 
(five wells, production facilities with a design capacity of 30,000 barrels of oil per day 
and an oil pipeline to the terminal located in the nearby town of Shubarkuduk) was 
retained.
Temir Block B (UK and 
Turkey)
JV between BP and TPAO in the Aktyubinsk region near the Caspian Sea and close to 
the large oil field of Zhanazhol, with the area said to have 330 million barrels of oil.
Dunga Block 
The 108.5 square miles onshore block is located 31.07 miles north of Aktau in the 
Mangystau oblast in western Kazakhstan developed by Maersk Oil (Denmark), Partex 
(UAE), and Oman Oil.
Tethys Petroleum Ltd. (U.S.) Deep well drilling in the Akkulka Block in southern Kazakhstan and is currently 
producing gas from the Kyzyloi Field in southwest Kazakhstan near the Aral Sea.
Turan Petroleum Turan is a Nevada-based independent energy company. Geological testing, conduct 
exploratory drilling, and extract hydrocarbons from the ARIS concession site.
Zhaikmunai L.P.
Zhaikmunai is a California-based independent oil and gas enterprise currently 
engaging in the exploration, production, and sale of crude oil and gas condensate in 
northwestern Kazakhstan. Exploration of Chinarevskoye Field with 397 million barrels 
of oil equivalents are 2P (proved plus probable) reserves and 359 million barrels of oil 
equivalents are possible reserves (125.1 square miles in size, located in the province 
of Batys, near the border between Kazakhstan and Russia, and close to several major 
pipelines). Zhaikmunai is constructing an oil pipeline from the Chinarevskoye Field to 
the rail connection near Uralsk, along with a new receiving oil loading terminal at the 
connection, which will allow Zhaikmunai to deliver its oil directly to the loading terminal.
Turan2 (China and Canada)
Developing Kzylkiya, Maybulak, Aryskum fields. Turan is owned by PetroKazakhstan 




Developing Kara-Arna Field. The JV partners are KazMunaiGaz and Prumsylove 
Stavitelstvi (Czech Republic).
Aktobe Preussag Munai Ltd. 
2 (Germany)
Exploration near Zharkamys, East and West. The JV partners are Preussag Gmbh 
(Germany) and KazMunaiGaz.
Steppe (Stepnoi) Leopard2 
(Canada)
Development of Teplovsko-Tokareyev fields with more than 100 million barrels of 
estimated oil reserves. The JV is owned by Snow Leopard Resources and Snow 
Leopard International of Canada.
Zhetibay-Quest2 Well rehab at Zhetibay Field, which has 3.4947 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
resources. The JV partners are Mannai (Qatar), Quest (UK), and KazMunaiGaz.
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.






































































Signed a 25-year Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the Cheleken contract area in the 
Eastern Caspian Sea that will expire in May 2025. Dragon Oil had proved and probable oil 
reserves at 30 June 2008 of 644 million barrels (of which Dragon Oil's share was 283 million 
barrels) and 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas resources. There are currently 49 active wells producing 
from 11 platforms. In August 2009, announced that it would be unable to meet its investment 
targets in Turkmenistan for 2009, primarily owing to the limited availability of rigs and qualified 
contractors in the Caspian region. The company said that it would now drill only eight wells in 
2009, compared with the ten or twelve that it had planned, and invested $400 million. For 2010, 
DGO plans to invest $600-800 with the bulk of investments to be used to upgrade production 
facilities.
ENI (Italy) by 
acquiring Burren 
Energy (UK)
ENI purchased Burren Energy of UK in 2008 and its production in Turkmenistan in 2008 reached 
12,000 billion barrels per day. In 1996, Burren signed a 25-year PSA contract at the onshore 
Nebit-Dag oilfield (1,050km or 652 miles) in western Turkmenistan which contains five developed 
oil and gas fields, including deep reservoirs beneath the Nebit Dag and Kum Dag fields. Burren 
has 100% production rights of the Burun oil field which, at the end of 2005, was producing 
approximately 19,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day from 135 wells. In April 2008, a controversy 
ensued in which Turkmenistan denied entry visas to managers from ENI SpA, the move was a 




In July 1996, Petronas and the government of Turkmenistan signed a 25-year PSA for the 
exploration, development and production of Block 1 (located about 80km or 50 miles southwest 
of Turkmenbashi), including the Garagel-Deniz (Gubkin), Deyarbekir (Barinov), and Magtymguly 
(East Livanov) fields. In December 2007, Petronas was granted permission to construct oil 
platforms and participate in pipeline construction in Turkmenistan. In summer 2008, a 1202 ton 
platform was installed for Petronas by Momentum Engineering in 197 feet of water offshore of 
Turkmenistan. In 2005, Petronas' subsidiary Malaysia LNG Tiga Sdn Bhd (MNLG) signed an 
agreement with Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas) to supply up to 97.4 billion cubic feet of LNG per 
annum for 20 years starting in 2008, with an option of another five year extension.
Technip (France)
Since 2005, full Block 1 field development (offshore and onshore), including pre front end 
engineering design and development and onshore gas plant, for Petronas Carigali Gas Field. 




In October 2007, Scomi won a RM157 million (US$46.6 million) contract in Turkmenistan from 




Maersk oil, Wintershall (Germany), and ONGC-Mittal (OMEL, India) signed a PSA in 2002 to 
develop Blocks 11 and 12, covering some 5,700 sq. kms (2201 sq. miles) offshore Turkmenistan 
in the Caspian Sea. Exploration activities are in progress. After License share assignments in 
2007, Maersk Oil holds an interest of 36 percent. Wintershall is operator and holds 34 percent, 
and OMEL holds the remaining 30 percent
Itera (Russia)
PSA signed with Turkmen State Agency for Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources 
on September 13, 2009 to develop offshore gas field--Block 21--in the Caspian Sea that is 
expected to annually produce 353 billion cubic feet of gas and 146.6 million barrels of oil. The 
total reserves in the block could amount to 1,172.8 million barrels of oil and 2,118 billion cubic feet 
of gas. Itera plans to invest up to US $ one billion in the project.
RWE AG 
(Germany)
PSC (Production Sharing Contract) signed with the State Agency for Management and Use 
of Hydrocarbon Resources on July 16, 2009 to develop offshore gas field--Block 23-- in the 
Caspian Sea. After acquisition, processing and interpretation of seismic data, RWE plan to drill 
one exploratory well by 2013. If the well proves to be successful, further appraisal drilling will be 
considered. Hydrocarbons from Block 23 may contribute to filling the planned Nabucco pipeline 





Turkmenistan signed a landmark deal allowing CNPC to drill for gas in one of Turkmenistan’s 
most promising fields, Bagtyyarlyk. According to Chinese experts, it holds some 60.01 trillion 
cubic feet of reserves, enough to feed the planned Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline pipe at 
committed volumes for 30 years.
Turkmenistan: Foreign Development of Oil and Gas 

































































China agreed a $4 billion loan in June to fund the development of part of the huge South 
Yolotan-Osman gas field near the Turkmen-Iranian border. The South Yolotan-Osman field in 




KazTransGaz and Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Ltd. (owned by China National Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Development Corp., a subsidiary of CNPC) formed a joint venture in February 
2008 to be sole operator of the Kazakh section of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline. Trans-Asia 
Gas Pipeline Ltd. formed similar joint ventures with relevant Uzbek and Turkmen gas companies 
to operate their respective sections of the gas pipeline. The Turkmenistan-China trunk will 
consist of two parallel 1,067-mm OD pipelines and five compressor stations capable of 
transporting 30 billion cu m/year. Cost estimates in 2007 totaled more than $6.5 billion. CNPC 
will provide 100% financing for the pipeline and hopes to start building the Chinese section by 
2010.
Buried Hill Energy 
(Canada)
In November 2007, Buried Hill signed a PSA with Turkmen government for operations and 
exploration of offshore Block III. To date, Buried Hill has successfully shot 1,864 miles of 2D 
seismic, with current operations focused on the interpretation of the Block III seismic data and 
in the development of initial drilling plans in the Serdar field with estimated reserves of 500 
million barrels.
Mitro (Austria) A consortium of the Austrian Mitro and TurkmenNeft is working on Hazar concession since 
2000. Investments were recovered long ago from this operation.
Pars Energy (Iran)
During 2000–2005, Pars Energy built three terminals for loading and unloading liquefied 
petroleum gas in railroad tank cars and road tankers in Turkmenabat and at the railway stations 
in Sarahs and Serhetabat. Pars Energy signed a 22.7905 million Euro (US$33.65 million) 
contract with Turkmenbashi Oil Refinery Complex in October 2005 to build a liquefied natural 
gas terminal at the port of Kiyanly on Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea coast that would also 
connect with an existing LNG terminal at Turkmenbashi Oil Refinery Complex and an LNG tank 
farm at Kiyanly. The terminal was officially announced completed in December 2009 and has 
annual throughput capacity of 9.74 trillion cubic feet. The total storage capacity of the terminals 
exceeds 511.35 million cubic feet of LNG.
Larmag Energy 
(the Netherlands)
The Turkmen government has twice suspended Larmag's export licenses as a means of 
renegotiating its contract. It has also failed to pay Larmag for oil sent to the Turkmenbashi 
refinery. Larmag Energy and its partners have developed the offshore Lam oilfields and 
Zhdanov structure in the Caspian Sea; both are in Block II (Cheleken). The block was acquired 
in 1992 in partnership with Chelekenmorneftegaz (CMNG), now a unit of Turkmenneft, and 
since 1996 Larmag Energy kept only twenty percent of the Larmag-Cheleken JV with Dragon 
and CMNG holding thirty and fifty, respectively. In 1992, Larmag took another block. Larmag's 
Bermuda-registered subsidiary, Larmag Energy Assets, hired Santa Fe and Monument Oil & 
Gas (Great Britain) as operators for the two blocks.
Bridas Sapic 
(Argentina)
Bridas was Turkmenistan’s largest foreign investor and the first Western company to become 
involved in the gas and oil sector; main project was the Yashlar field, which reportedly contains 
27.181 trillion cubic meters gas reserves and 165 million barrels of oil. In 1994 and 1995, 
Turkmenistan ordered Bridas to halt operations in Keimir oil and gas field and cease making 
imports into and exports from Turkmenistan. Bridas commenced an arbitration proceeding 
against Turkmenistan six months later. As a result of the arbitration proceedings, the Texas 
Federal Court has determined that the Bridas’ contract with Turkmenistan could not be 
overturned and therefore it still has the right to exploit Daulatabad, Keimir, and Yashlar fields.
Exxon Mobil (U.S.)
After disappointing well test results, Exxon Mobil shut down its operations in Turkmenistan in 
2002. The Garashsyzlyk 2 well was drilled to 11,320 feet, instead of the 17,390 feet originally 
planned. Operator Exxon Mobil (52.4 percent) has led a consortium developing the field since 
1998.
Royal Dutch/
Shell (UK and 
Netherlands)
In 2002, reduced its presence in Turkmenistan to minimum. The company had hoped to 
become involved in the upstream development side of the Trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP) 
project.
Chevron (U.S.)
Chevron is interested in establishing a long-term partnership with Turkmenistan and actively 
participating in investment projects in the oil and gas sector. As part of cooperation, 
Turkmenistan and Chevron plan joint development of hydrocarbon resources that sit at 
greater depths in subsalt sediments. Chevron also plans to organize trainings for Turkmen 
specialists to operate Chevron technologies, as well as to invest into the development of social 
infrastructure in Turkmenistan, such as health, education, small and medium businesses.
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